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Abstract The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien
possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a
problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to
play a truthmaking role. Ingram offers an alternative Platonic account which makes
use of modal instantiation relations. In this paper, I highlight some of the costs of
Ingram’s new account and argue that a more appealing version of Platonism—and
modal theory in general—is one that is supplemented with an ontology of totality
facts.
1 Introduction
In a recent article, Ingram (2016) has rightly questioned how a Platonist can provide
truthmakers for truths about what is merely possible. Here a mere possibility is
understood as one involving an alien property: a property that is not instantiated by
anything, but which might have been. As Ingram sees it, my recent Platonic account
of mere possibilities involves an implicit commitment to negative facts, which even
the most ardent truthmaker theorists should be reluctant to accept. A commitment to
negative facts would violate a principle that Ingram calls ‘Positivity’, which says
‘everything that exists is positive’ (2016, p. 1275). A rejection of Positivity, Ingram
urges, would be a large theoretical cost, which suggests my Platonic account is not
attractive.
Ingram has an alternative Platonic account of modality to offer, which says that
truths about what is possible are determined by ‘modal instantiation’ relations. On
this modified theory, the truth that something might have been F is made true by the
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fact that something ‘stands in the modal instantiation relation (‘possibly-having’)’ to
F (2016, p. 1280). Modified instantiation relations have been popular in recent
metaphysical work, for instance in McKinnon and Bigelow (2012), where the notion
of temporal (having-had) instantiation is used. Ingram is (I believe) the first to use
modified instantiation relations in modal theory, and this opens up a new line of
enquiry in the modal debate.
However, in this paper I shall consider ways of defending an alternative approach
for Platonists like me to deal with the problem that Ingram raises. This is
worthwhile because, as we shall see, the modal instantiation proposal faces
problems of its own. The theory of negativity that I shall recommend to Platonists—
and modal theorists in general—is one which appeals to totality facts (more on this
below). This solution should be attractive to those who, like me, favour the idea that
all truths have truthmakers. This is a theory which Ingram considers but he
concludes that his own approach, which involves the denial that negative truths have
truthmakers, is to be preferred. My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on these
conclusions.
2 The Problem of Negativity
Why think that modal Platonism involves an implicit commitment to negative facts?
Well, according to the theory, the existence of a (Platonic) universal is sufficient for
the possibility of that universal’s instantiation. Universals have an irreducible modal
aspect to them in the sense that they are by their very nature instantiable (Tugby
2015, p. 35).1 However, as Ingram points out near the end of his paper, the existence
of universals alone cannot provide truthmakers for truths about which possibilities
are mere possibilities. In cases of mere possibility, the universal in question is not
instantiated by anything. Yet, the existence of a universal is (obviously) compatible
with its being instantiated. This means that the existence of universal alone cannot
necessitate the truth that a certain possibility is a mere possibility. As Ingram puts it:
The fact that F exists is compossible with the fact that a is F (and so consistent
with the truth that a is F). And, as such, facts about the mere existence of
universals don’t fully determine truths about what’s merely possible (2016,
p. 1284).
Ingram’s conclusion, then, is that for a modal Platonist like me, the truthmaker for a
truth about a possibility being a mere possibility must ultimately consist in a
conjunction of facts: the existence of the relevant universal plus whatever
determines the negative truth that the universal has no instantiations. In the latter
case the most obvious candidate would be a negative fact.
Ingram has uncovered an important issue here, and it has broad significance.
Since mere possibilities are possibilities which have not been realized, any modal
theorists who are serious about truthmaking must deal with the question Ingram
1 This means that I reject the existence of universals, such as ‘being a square triangle’, which cannot
possibly be instantiated. We will return to the issue of ‘impossible’ universals later in Sect. 3.
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raises. I agree that belief in the existence of negative facts is untenable, partly for the
reasons Ingram gives. However, as Ingram is well aware, there are alternative ways
of dealing with negative truth for people who, like me, think all truths have
truthmakers. One of the most popular truthmaking strategies in recent years has
been Armstrong’s totality fact theory (2004, p. 58). As Ingram explains, ‘David
Armstrong proposes the existence of a totality fact: a higher-order fact that sums
(‘totals’) all positive lower-order facts and determines that’s all there is to reality’
(2016, p. 1276). More precisely, a totality fact is best understood as an irreducibly
complex fact: the first-order fact that a collection of entities exists combined with
the higher-order fact that those are all the entities of that kind.2 On this theory, then,
the truthmaker for the truth that a property F is not instantiated is the fact that such-
and-such property instantiations exist, combined with the (higher-order) fact that
those are all the instantiations that there are. Since, by hypothesis, an instantiation of
F will not be among those first-order instantiations, the totality fact necessitates the
truth that F is not instantiated. If we combine this approach with my Platonic view,
we are left with the following account: truths about possibilities being mere
possibilities are made true by the existence of the relevant universals together with
the totality fact that such-and-such property instantiations are all that there are.
As mentioned above, Ingram argues that, ultimately, this account of mere
possibility is more costly than the one he recommends, which utilizes ‘modal
instantiation’ ties. But before addressing Ingram’s criticisms, let us consider
Ingram’s account in more detail and bring some of its own costs to light.
3 Ingram’s Modal Instantiation Approach
An issue that Ingram has to address concerns what he himself should say about
negative truth. For as indicated above, it seems undeniable that the concept of an
alien property involves negativity. An alien property is precisely one that is not
instantiated, but could have been. Ingram’s solution is to deny that truths about what
is not instantiated have truthmakers at all. This option is not open to me because I
favour the Armstrongian view that all truths have truthmakers (Tugby 2015, p. 32).
However, Ingram urges that one can deny that negative truths have truthmakers
while allowing that other truths do. Among these other truths are precisely truths
about possibility, which are of the form ‘a might have been F’ (2016, p. 1280). For
Ingram, the truthmaker for these kinds of truths is the fact that the relevant things
stand in modal instantiation relations to F. In terms of truthmaking, then, Ingram’s
theory only delivers an account of truths of the form ‘a might have been F’. Modal
instantiation relations do not themselves make any negative propositions true,
because truths about it being possible for a to be F are compatible with both a’s
2 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasising this point.
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being F and a’s not being F (more on this below). Hence, where negative truths are
concerned, Ingram is content to say that there are no truthmakers whatsoever.
An important question to ask, though, concerns how this theory accounts for all
the kinds of truths that my Platonic theory was attempting to deal with. The main
aim of modal Platonism, to recall, is to account for the problematic notion of mere
possibility. It is therefore important to consider how Ingram’s theory accounts for
the truth that a certain possibility is a mere possibility. When we consider this
question, some of the costs of Ingram’s theory are brought to light.
First, it seems clear that modal instantiation relations alone cannot determine
truths about which possibilities are mere possibilities. No matter how many things
stand in a modal instantiation relation to a given universal, this alone cannot
necessitate that the instantiation of that universal is a mere possibility. For no matter
how many things stand in this modal instantiation relation, this will still be
compatible with there being things which instantiate the universal. Hence, the
relevant modal instantiation facts do not by themselves necessitate truths about
possibilities being mere because they are always compatible with those possibilities
not being mere possibilities. In fact, what Ingram seems to require after all is
something like a totality fact, which ensures that no further things instantiate the
universal in question.3
Now, Ingram is aware of a worry along these lines. He acknowledges that modal
instantiation relations alone do not necessitate which properties are and are not the
alien properties. He writes:
… no matter how many particulars stand in the modal instantiation relation
(‘possibly-having’) to F, such (positive) facts about F are together insufficient
to determine that F is an alien property. To guarantee that F is alien, it must be
that F isn’t instantiated in the standard way, i.e. nothing ‘actually has’ F. Here
we apparently require a further fact, determining that all the positive facts
there are about particulars ‘possibly-having’ F are all the facts there are about
G [sic.]. But such a fact is a totality fact and is undoubtedly negative (as
above) (2016, p. 1280).
Ingram’s response to this issue is, as before, that we do not need to provide
truthmakers for negative truths. He rhetorically asks ‘well, why think that negative
truths have truthmakers?’ (2016, p. 1280). At this point, however, I think it is
important to get clear on whether truths about possibilities being mere possibilities
really are to be classed purely as negative truths. The apparent need for totality facts
suggests that such truths have a negative component. But are they purely negatively
truths? I think they clearly are not. Consider the following case. It is a purely
negative truth that nothing is actually a square triangle. But does it follow that being
a square triangle is a mere possibility? Most would say not. Rather, it seems that
such a property cannot possibly be instantiated.
3 Note that the modal instantiation theory is perfectly compatible with acceptance of totality facts.
However, as we shall see later, there are reasons for thinking that the pairing of realism about totalities
with my Platonic modal theory is more favourable.
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I assume that Ingram would not want to say that it is a (mere) possibility for
something to be a square triangle. So, it seems that what his view of mere possibility
amounts to is this: the truth that a certain possibility (call it F) is a mere possibility is
a conjunction of truths: the truth that something might be F together with the truth
that nothing is actually F. Ingram’s metaphysical theory would then say that
although the first conjunct has a truthmaker, in the form of modal instantiation facts,
the second conjunct does not need a truthmaker (because it is negative).4 And since
nothing stands in a modal instantiation relation to the property of being a square
triangle (since nothing could have such a property), Ingram can consistently deny
that square triangles are mere possibilities.
This seems like the best way for Ingram’s account to go. But unfortunately, there
are reasons for thinking this is still not quite satisfactory. The problem is that this
account seems to rule out the metaphysical possibility of property instantiations in
cases where, as it happens, nothing actual could instantiate such properties. This is
because, in line with the interpretation immediately above, a mere possibility
requires the existence of an object which stands in a modal instantiation relation to
the universal in question. But can we guarantee that all mere possibilities are such
that some actual object stands in a modal instantiation relation to the relevant
universal? Could there not be ‘radically’ alien properties, which are so unusual that
nothing actual is able to give rise to instantiations of such properties? Maybe we do
not even have to illustrate the point with recherche´ examples. For instance, only
with the rise of technological developments did certain objects have the capacity to
carry out complex computing tasks. Before computers were constructed, it seems
that nothing would have stood in a modal instantiation relation to the property of
carrying out a complex computing task. Nonetheless, it was surely still the case that
such tasks were metaphysically possible. Indeed, maybe there are computer tasks
that will forever remain mere possibilities because of technological limitations.
Other examples: there are reasons for thinking that, given the structure of the
physical world, no physical object could take on the form of a perfect circle. Yet, it
seems that perfect circles are metaphysically possible in some sense. If they were
not, we would have to say that the property of being a perfect circle has the same
modal status as the property of being a square triangle, which seems far too strong.
There are many such examples that one could produce. In our world, nothing has the
capacity to exhibit a frictionless plane, but again frictionless planes intuitively have
a different modal status to square triangles. It is far from clear how Ingram’s theory
can accommodate these differences. In contrast, an advocate of my theory can say
that the metaphysical possibility of alien properties is grounded by the fact that alien
properties exist (unlike the property of being a square triangle), regardless of
whether anything actual has the capacity to produce an instantiation of those
properties.
In response, a proponent of the modal instantiation theory might try to deal with
some of the cases above by claiming that although there might be nothing that
4 For this reason, Ingram’s theory amounts to a partial abandonment of the project of providing
truthmakers for facts of mere possibility, which some may find alarming. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for raising this point.
Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity
123
directly stands in a modal relation to an alien property, some things might be related
to it indirectly, via iterated properties. For instance, in the computer case we might
say that although there was a time when nothing had the capacity to carry out a
computing task, it was nonetheless the case that things stood in the modal
instantiation relation to the property to become an object which can carry out a
complex computing task.5 In this iterated way, the possibility of complex computing
tasks would be preserved.
At first glance, this looks like a promising proposal, and indeed a similar move
has been made recently by Vetter (2015), who tries to accommodate the possibility
of alien properties within her Aristotelian modal framework. In response to the
challenge, Vetter appeals to iterated potentiality:
If an alien natural property is simply a natural property that is never actually
instantiated, then there is at least the epistemic possibility that some things—
the matter at the beginning of the universe, if nothing else—have or had the
potentiality to produce or constitute objects with some such properties (2015,
p. 269).
Unfortunately, though, this strategy is limited, as we shall now see.6 Above I said
that, first and foremost, the problem at hand for the modal instantiation theorist
concerns ‘radically’ alien properties. Some alien properties are more radical than
others, as illustrated by the distinction that Vetter draws between alien properties
and super-alien properties. Vetter asks: ‘Is it not possible … that there be objects
with (natural) properties that no actual thing ever had a potentiality to have, to
produce, or to constitute? Call such properties super-alien properties’ (2015,
p. 269). Clearly, in the case of super-alien properties, the solution used in the
computer case cannot be applied because by definition it is not possible for any
worldly objects to become or to compose an object that has the capacity to
instantiate a super-alien property (Vetter 2015, p. 265). Hence, in such cases,
worldly things do not even have iterated capacities in which to ground the
possibility of such properties.
Do any of the examples outlined above fall into the super-alien category? It
seems that they do, on the plausible assumption that nothing has the capacity to do
what is physically impossible. Since, unlike the computer case, it is physically
impossible to produce a frictionless plane, the latter looks like an example of a
super-alien property on Vetter’s definition. How, then, can super-alien properties be
dealt with by a modal instantiation theorist? It seems there are two options, both of
which come at a theoretical cost.
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this particular example.
6 Note also that there is a further complication regarding the iterated property strategy. Positing iterated
modal properties will hardly be straightforward because it seems implausible to think that, before
computers were invented, any one object had the capacity to become an object that can carry out a
computing task. This is for the obvious reason that computers are composed of a diverse range of
materials and components. This means that it would have to be a plurality of objects which stood in the
modal instantiation relation to the relevant iterated property. In short, then, this proposal plausibly
commits us to the notion of plural quantification and plural (many-one) instantiation, which is an
ideological cost. Discussing this issue would take us too far from current concerns, but for a list of critics
of plural quantification, see Linnebo (2004).
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The first option is the one that Vetter opts for, which is to simply deny the
metaphysical possibility of super-alien properties. This comes at a cost, as Vetter
admits when she describes this as a ‘bullet biting’ strategy (2015, p. 269). For
instance, this strategy clashes with our modal intuitions, because instances of super-
alien properties (such as frictionless planes) certainly seem conceivable. Moreover,
idealisation is commonplace in science and in such cases scientists often theorise
about what would or would not be true of super-alien instantiations. It is far from
clear how the objectivity of such theorising can be preserved once we are told that
super-alien scenarios are as metaphysically incoherent as those involving square
triangles.
There is also an important dialectical reason for a proponent of Ingram’s theory
to be reluctant to reject the possibility of super-alien properties. Ingram’s theory is
developed in the context of a Platonic theory of properties, and as Vetter
acknowledges (2015, pp. 269–270), one of the main strengths of Platonism is that it
apparently has the resources to accommodate the metaphysical possibility of all
kinds of alien property. If this perceived advantage is renounced by the Platonic
modal instantiation theorists, it becomes unclear what advantage Platonism has over
Vetter’s Aristotelian theory, at least where modality is concerned. At this point,
then, one would wonder why we shouldn’t reject modal instantiation relations in
favour of Vetter’s primitive potentialities.
Let us then consider the second option. This is an option which Vetter could have
taken but did not. This option is to accept that although no actual concrete objects
have the (iterated) capacity to produce super-alien instantiations, there are
nonetheless non-concrete possible individuals which have such capacities. Accord-
ing to Williamson’s actualist version of this kind of theory (1998), these possibilia
are abstract individuals which are just as actual as the concrete ones. Within
Ingram’s framework, one could then accommodate the possibility of super-alien
properties by saying that although no concrete objects stand in the modal
instantiation relation to super-alien properties, there are nonetheless abstract
individuals which stand in such a relation and which thereby secure the
metaphysical possibility of such properties.
I shall not attempt to critically assess the possible individuals theory here, but
what should immediately be apparent is that the commitment to abstract individuals
is a major ontological commitment for the modal instantiation theorist to make. I
shall not speculate about whether Ingram would prefer to reject super-alien
properties or to accept abstract individuals, but either way, consideration of these
issues will help to advance discussion of his theory and bring its precise costs to
light. Importantly, though, note that this choice is not one that I have to make,
because on my theory it is the existence of a universal alone which secures the
metaphysical possibility of its instantiation, and this will be so even if there is
nothing which actually has the (iterated) capacity to produce an instance of that
property.7
7 Moreover, my theory delivers the correct result that it is not metaphysically possible for there to be a
square triangle, because as we saw in footnote 1, my view does not allow the existence of such properties.
My argument (2015, p. 35) here is that it is metaphysically incoherent to suppose that a square triangle
could be instantiated, and instantiability is the only defining characteristic there can be for a universal. As
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4 Ingram’s Strategy and the Totality Strategy Compared
Let us now make some further comparisons between Ingram’s approach to mere
possibility and the totality fact strategy that I prefer. Ingram does not like the
totality fact view and asserts that his own approach is more theoretically
conservative. However, it is not clear that Ingram’s account of mere possibility
really is more theoretically virtuous than the totality fact truthmaking strategy.
Ingram rejects the totality fact strategy because it retains an element of negativity.
A totality fact, to recall, is a complex fact that such and such obtains and no more
than that obtains. The second conjunct is negative, but I believe it is questionable
whether totality facts are as objectionable as pure negative facts, as we shall now
see.
First, it is important to note that totality facts avoid the sort of complaint that
motivates Ingram’s suspicion of negative ontology. Here, Ingram appeals to
Mumford’s argument that a negative fact ‘sounds like an absence of a fact, and an
absence is nothing at all’ (Mumford 2007, p. 46, in Ingram 2016, p. 1275). As we
saw earlier, a totality fact is a complex fact that has as a constituent a first order fact
concerning what positively obtains, and for this reason totality facts seem to avoid
the main problem facing the negative fact view. Describing totality facts as absences
would be to mis-describe them because totality facts are precisely totalities of first-
order facts which positively obtain. This is not to say that a totality fact is not
partially negative, of course. Again, totalities are complex facts: the first-order fact
that a collection of entities exists combined with the higher-order fact those are all
the entities of that kind. This higher-order fact involves negativity, because to say
that those are all the entities is to say that there are no more of them. However, the
important point for current purposes is that on the totality theory there are no free
standing first-order absences. The higher-order totality fact can only exist as a
constituent in a complex fact which involves positive first-order entities. This is why
I take the totality fact approach to be a more moderate theory of negativity than one
which accepts the existence of first-order negative facts.
To be fair to Ingram, he does consider the response that partial negativity is more
acceptable than full-blown negativity. Even if the totality fact theory is more
moderate in some respects, Ingram still maintains that we should be suspicious of
any negative ontology whatsoever. A more conservative theory, he suggests, is one
that commits to a strong version of the Positivity principle, which says that ‘Nothing
exists that is negative’ (2016, p. 1277). Why, though, should we be so suspicious of
all negative ontology? For the purposes of his paper, Ingram does not attempt to say
anything new about why we should be suspicious (2016, p. 1275), but appeals to
previous arguments by others such as Dodd and Mumford.8 I have already dealt
with Mumford’s worry above, which leaves Dodd’s. Dodd says that ‘…ontological
Footnote 7 continued
I remark (2015, p. 35, fn. 7), this conclusion echoes the one drawn by Bigelow and Pargetter, who appeal
to the principle that only coherent predicates can correspond to universals (1990, p. 203).
8 Ingram (2016, p. 1275) also includes a quotation by Russell, which asserts that negative facts are
unpalatable but does not explain why they are unpalatable. Given that this particular quote does not
contain an argument, I shall not discuss it further.
M. Tugby
123
commitment to absences would seem to be tantamount to a category mistake. …
absences are not themselves things, and so cannot be truthmakers’ (Dodd 2007,
p. 388, quoted in Ingram 2016, p. 1275). Now, I think this is a good argument
against free standing first-order negative facts: such facts are absences and cannot be
considered genuine things—which they would have to be to serve as truthmakers.
But can the same be argument be applied to totality facts? For the same sorts of
reasons raised in connection with Mumford’s worry, I think it is far from clear that
totality facts cannot be considered as ‘things’. Again, totality facts are not free
standing first-order absences, as negative facts would have to be. Totality facts are
irreducibly complex facts that contain positive first-order facts as constituents. Since
those first-order positive facts are clearly things, then it seems reasonable to regard
totality facts as things also, given that they are partially constituted by those things.
In short, although I agree that the arguments marshalled by Ingram create trouble for
proponents of negative facts, it is less clear that those same arguments can be
applied successfully to the totality fact theory.9
It is also worth noting that there are good independent reasons for thinking that
totality facts are more acceptable than negative facts. I will mention two salient
reasons here, reasons upon which totality theorists should place more weight. First,
it is plausible that, unlike negative facts, totality facts satisfy Armstrong’s own
criterion for ontological commitment, which is known as the Eleatic Principle.
According to this meta-ontological principle, it is acceptable to postulate the
existence of an entity only if its existence could make a causal difference to the
world. In the case of negative facts, it is far from clear how such facts could have
any genuine causal power.10 In contrast, if we were to suppose that totality facts
exist, it is relatively easy to see how they could confer distinctive causal power. For
instance, suppose I touch a live wire which is conveying a total current of 100
milliamperes. Suppose that I get severe burns as a result but survive because only
total currents above 100 milliamperes would kill me. Here it seems that the relevant
totality fact has a distinctive causal power: since the current was at 100
milliamperes and no more, I was burned rather than killed.
Second, for all one’s qualms about providing truthmakers for negated atomic
propositions, it seems reasonable for a truthmaker theorist to expect that universally
quantified propositions have truthmakers given that existentially quantified propo-
sitions clearly do. However, universal quantifiers are precisely totality operators of
sorts: a universal quantifier ranges over everything in the domain of discourse and
nothing more. Hence, it is prima facie plausible that, whatever one’s views about
9 Ingram (2016, p. 1278) also alludes to another objection to the totality fact view from Schaffer, which is
that it violates the principle of free recombination (Schaffer 2008, p. 12, fn. 4). Like Ingram, though, I
shall not discuss this issue in detail here. I do not think this consideration has a great deal of weight given
that many current theories of natural modality already violate free recombination. The thesis of free
recombination is a Humean principle and is now firmly rejected by many modal theorists such as the
dispositionalists and some nomic primitivists, whose theories commit them to necessary connections
between distinct properties.
10 It has been claimed by some that an absence of water causes a plant to die. But it does not seem
plausible to think that this sort of causal explanation is fundamental. Rather, the ‘deep’ metaphysical story
about such cases is that when there is a lack of water, a plant undergoes a positive biochemical process
which is the genuine cause of its death. See Molnar (2003, pp. 77–79) for further discussion.
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negative atomic facts, totality facts will have to be part of the truthmaking story
about universally quantified truths.11 Not enough truthmaker theorists have
addressed this issue in the literature, but it is plausible that the rejection of totality
facts will come at a truthmaking cost where universal quantification is concerned.
Hence, it may be that the strong reading of Ingram’s Positivity principle will rule
out more cases of truthmaking than is immediately apparent.
There is much more to be said about these issues, but such work will have to be
undertaken elsewhere. To conclude this paper we must now address a further
argument that Ingram could marshal against totality facts. Clearly, a commitment to
totality facts is a theoretical cost in so far as a theory which does without them is
more parsimonious. In order to assess whether this argument has any weight, we
must assess whether Ingram’s own modal theory is more parsimonious than a
Platonic totality fact view. I shall conclude by arguing that it is not. Although
Ingram avoids totality facts, his account of mere possibility involves modal
instantiation relations, which are themselves a significant theoretical cost.
Now, as Ingram himself acknowledges, the beauty of totality facts is that you do
not require many of them. Rather than invoking, say, a vast array of negative facts,
we need only ‘… a single all state of affairs’ (Armstrong 2004, p. 58 quoted in
Ingram 2016, p. 1277). Of course, Ingram needs neither negative facts nor totality
facts. However, in their place his theory of modality requires the instantiation of a
modal instantiation relation for every fact about possibility.
Perhaps it is a little hasty to conclude that the totality view is more parsimonious,
however. First, in terms of qualitative parsimony, Ingram’s theory and the one
proposed here are roughly on a par because they both invoke one kind of
metaphysical entity that we did not have before. Moreover, according to
philosophers like Lewis (1973, p. 87), qualitative parsimony is more theoretically
important than quantitative parsimony (which merely concerns how many token
instances of a given kind of entity exist). Second, it is far from clear that a totality
fact theorist can get away with positing just one u¨ber totality fact to do all of the
truthmaking work. Armstrongian truthmaker theorists are fond of minimal
truthmakers, for it is only these which provide fine grained metaphysical
explanations for a truth. For instance, surely the truth that all humans are mortal
more accurately reflects a totality fact about humans rather than the world as whole
(namely, the fact that there are no more humans than these and that each of them is
mortal). Hence, it is far from clear that the totality fact theory is more quantitatively
parsimonious than Ingram’s.
Are these responses decisive? I do not think they are. Regarding the distinction
between qualitative and quantitative parsimony, it is true that Ingram’s theory is no
worse off than the totality theory in terms of qualitative parsimony. It is also true
that some philosophers think that qualitative parsimony is a more important
theoretical consideration than quantitative parsimony. However, even if this last
claim is correct (and I have my doubts), it is implausible to think that quantitative
parsimony is an unimportant theoretical consideration. See, for example, the
11 It is also worth noting that totality operations are prevalent in science, as in the case of resultant
vectors.
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arguments of Nolan (1997), who concludes that quantitative parsimony is a genuine
theoretical virtue in science. If this is right, then even if Ingram’s view and the
totality view score equally well on qualitative parsimony, the totality fact theory
would still be more attractive if it were quantitatively more parsimonious, all else
being equal. Hence, we must now turn to the second objection above, which
suggests that the totality theory may not be quite as quantitatively parsimonious as
first appears.
My response here is that, indeed, there will have to be a lot of different totality
facts so that there are minimal truthmakers for all the totality truths. More precisely,
there will have to be a totality fact for every kind of thing that we can speak of, such
a chairs in a room, mortal humans, and so on. However, this still amounts to fewer
extra token entities than are needed in the modal instantiation theory. Clearly, there
are fewer kinds of thing in existence than there are collective possibilities for
individual objects. Indeed, it seems that each object will stand in infinitely many
modal instantiation relations.12 Presumably, for instance, a medium sized malleable
object would stand in the modal instantiation relation to being triangular, being
square, being pentagon-shaped, being hexagon-shaped and so on. Perhaps these
properties are not genuine universals, but even at the level of physics, entities would
surely stand in many of Ingram’s modal instantiation relations. Fundamental laws
are typically functional in nature, which means they cover infinitely many
determinate magnitudes. For instance, a charged particle has the potential to
undergo a force of 2 dynes, a force of 3 dynes, a force of 4 dynes, and so on. In
contrast, it is not the case that there are infinitely many totality facts in, say, a given
room. In conclusion, then, although the totality theory and the modal instantiation
theory score equally well on qualitative parsimony, it looks like the former theory
requires fewer extra token entities overall.
5 Conclusion
In summary, Ingram must be applauded for uncovering a neglected issue relating to
the role of negative truth in theories of modality. He has also pushed the modal
debate forward by proposing a previously unexplored Platonic account of
truthmakers for modal truths. However, in this response I have suggested reasons
for thinking that an ontology of totality facts provides a more promising way for a
modal Platonist—and modal theorists in general—to deal with mere possibility.
Among other things, Ingram’s account might enforce counterintuitive restrictions on
what can count as merely possible and also provides an uneconomical metaphysical
account of the possibilities that it does allow.
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